Manifesto mania: NMW enforcement not a job for the Home Office

So, we’ve had the Labour manifesto. And the Labour manifesto for Work, the Labour manifesto for Women, the Labour manifesto for Young People, and the Labour manifesto for Black and Ethnic Minority communities. I imagine before 7 May we’ll have the Labour manifesto for Dog Owners, and the Labour manifesto for People Who Listen to the Archers. But today it seems we will get the Labour manifesto for Home Office officials.

According to a report in the Guardian, the main feature of this will be a new “Home Office investigative unit” to target “the illegal exploitation of migrant workers”. This will consist of a “team of more [than] 100 police officers and specialists from the Gangmasters Licensing Authority”, who will be given “new powers to stop the abuse of workers and increase the prosecutions and fines of employers who breach employment laws”.

It’s far from clear how much this new unit will cost, but the Guardian reports “it will be paid for by levying a charge on non-visa visitors to the UK which is expected to raise £55 million”. And the unit will have “one overriding duty”:

To stop the abuse that makes the working families of Britain poorer. This new unit will have the powers and funding it needs to increase the prosecutions and convictions of Britain’s worst employers: those who exploit workers and drag down the wages of everyone else.

All of which glosses over the fact that we already have not one but four public bodies (or units) with much the same overriding duty: the aforementioned Gangmasters Licensing Authority, the national minimum wage (NMW) enforcement unit of HMRC, the BIS Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate (EAS), and the working time directive unit at the Health & Safety Executive. And, to access one or more of these bodies, you have to contact a fifth: Acas.

All of these bodies/units are severely underfunded: HMRC currently gets just £12 million a year to enforce the NMW, the GLA just under £3 million, and the EAS is about five people. And, if you were a government minister with a blank sheet of paper and some £15 million to spend on ‘tackling Britain’s worst employers’, you wouldn’t design a system with four (or five) separate bodies or units. You might, as Vince Cable suggested last year, create a Workers’ Rights Agency (or, say, a Fair Employment Agency), with “the powers and funding it needs” to tackle Britain’s worst employers. (Sadly, that suggestion hasn’t got much further than the inside of Dr Cable’s head, but at least he and the Lib Dems are thinking on the right lines).

So, if you are a new minister on 8 May, charged with the same remit, and have as much as a further £55 million to spend, you really shouldn’t create yet another public body (or unit). And YOU CERTAINLY SHOULDN’T PUT IT IN THE FUCKING HOME OFFICE.

headdesk

[Postscript: here’s the Labour press release on Miliband’s speech]

 

Are there really no votes in employment rights?

So, the longest general election campaign in history – it surely started at least 12 months ago – has at last reached its final phase, with the three main political parties publishing their manifestos over a frantic three days at the start of this week. This blog’s founder, the fantabulous Sean Jones QC, has put his sanity at risk (so that you don’t have to) by ploughing through their combined 330 pages and documenting every last relevant policy commitment in the Hard Labour Guide to #ukemplaw Election Pledges. But I can’t resist adding a bit of (highly) subjective commentary.

Overall, it’s hard to avoid concluding that all three main parties see no great electoral advantage in trying to improve the working lives of some 30 million people. In 330 pages, there is just one mention of ‘flexible working’, and even that is just a reference (by the Lib Dems) to the Coalition’s extension of the right to request FW in 2014. Labour and the Liberal Democrats each use the word ‘exploitation’ in relation to workers just once, and the Tories four times – but five of those six uses of the word are in relation to migrant workers. Zero-hours contracts get six mentions by Labour, two by the Liberal Democrats, and one by the Tories, but there are no new ideas on how to tackle the exploitative use of such contracts. Despite the Coalition having handed the EHRC £1m to investigate “systemic” maternity discrimination, the issue gets just one brief mention (by Labour). And there is no mention anywhere of unfair dismissal.

Disappointingly, there is no space in the Liberal Democrats’ whopping, 160-page tome for Vince Cable’s October 2014 promise of a new Workers’ Rights Agency to “revamp efforts to enforce employment law and tackle the exploitation of workers” by combining the remits of “the minimum wage enforcement section of HMRC, the working time directive section at the Health & Safety Executive, the BIS Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate, and the GLA.” Perhaps I shouldn’t have pointed out that this was my idea. [Since I wrote this post, Jo Swinson has responded to a tweet from Sean Jones, saying “the idea still there” – ‘there’ presumably being the inside of Vince Cable’s head.]

Regular readers of this blog – hello David, Gem, Michael, Paul and Peter! – will not be surprised to hear that the first object of my skim reading was the issue of employment tribunal fees. The Tories let the cat out of the bag by claiming credit for “reducing the burden of employment law through our successful tribunal reforms” – that’s not what they said about their hefty, upfront fees at the time – and Labour can only find space for a tweaked, two-sentence version of the pledge previously set out in its Manifesto for Work:

The Conservatives have introduced fees of up to £1,200 for employment tribunal claimants, creating a significant barrier to workplace justice. We will abolish the Government’s employment tribunal fee system as part of wider reforms to make sure that affordability is not a barrier to workers having proper access to justice, employers get a quicker resolution, and the costs to the tax payer do not rise.

However, as noted previously on this blog, this raises at least as many questions as it answers. And note that the Manifesto for Work’s “costs to the taxpayer are controlled” has mutated to the arguably more restrictive “do not rise”.

Somewhat surprisingly, the Liberal Democrats are even more parsimonious on the subject of what their BIS employment relations minister, Jo Swinson, recently described as “one of the most high-profile debates around employment law in the last Parliament”. Their manifesto manages just a wishy-washy half sentence:

We will improve the enforcement of employment rights, reviewing employment tribunal fees to ensure they are not a barrier.

Whoopie doo. The Liberal Democrats devote more space to a promise of legal protection for bumblebee nests. Clearly, worker bees are more important than workers to a Liberal Democrat economy.

On the plus side, all three parties pledge to work to close the gender pay gap. The Tories say they “want to see full, genuine gender equality. The gender pay gap is the lowest on record, but we want to reduce it further and will push business to do so: we will require companies with more than 250 employees to publish the difference between the average pay of their male and female employees”. Similarly, a Labour government would “go further in reducing discrimination against women, requiring large companies to publish their gender pay gap and strengthening the law against maternity discrimination” – though there’s no indication of how they would do the latter. The Liberal Democrats only have enough space to say they would “work to end the gender pay gap, including with new rules on gender pay transparency”. The voting public could be forgiven for not realising that  little if any of this is new, mandatory gender pay gap reporting having been one of the last actions of the Coalition.

More positively, all three parties commit to the national minimum wage, and it’s especially heartening to see the Tories confirm they “strongly support the [NMW] and want to see further real-terms increases in the next Parliament”. They go on to expose the pathetic timidity of Labour’s promise of £8 per hour from October 2019, by stating: “We accept the recommendation of the Low Pay Commission that the [NMW rate] should rise to £6.70 this autumn, on course for a [rate] that will be over £8 by the end of the decade”. This is accompanied by a pledge to increase the tax-free Personal Allowance from £10,600 to £12,500, so that “those working 30 hours on the minimum wage pay no Income Tax”.

However,  as the FT’s John McDermott notes, this pledge is “less than it seems”, as a minimum wage rate of £8 per hour by the end of the decade would mean £12,480 per year for a worker on 30 hours per week. So, “give or take £20, [a Personal Allowance of £12,500] won’t make any tangible difference”. In any case, most workers on the minimum wage work fewer than 30 hours per week, so already pay very little if any Income Tax. And then there’s National Insurance.

Much the same can be said of the Tories’ other eye-catching move to outbid Labour’s core childcare offer (an expansion of “free childcare from 15 to 25 hours per week for working parents of three and four-year-olds, paid for with an increase in the bank levy”) with a pledge to “give families where all parents are working an entitlement to 30 hours of free childcare for their three and four year-olds”. This pledge is costed at £350m, which sounds too good to be true – and it is. As Sarah Hayward, leader of Camden council, points out in a splendid demolition job, the Tories have previously ‘costed’ Labour’s less ambitious pledge at £1.5bn (Labour’s own figure is £800m). So, to deliver 50% more extra hours than Labour for just £350m, “the quality of the childcare would need to be so appalling that no right-minded parent would ever subject their child to it”.

Elsewhere, the Liberal Democrats re-iterate their offer of an extra four weeks of paternity leave, but only at the current, lousy rate of pay (£138 per week, or just 60% of the NMW), and Labour repeats its February 2015 pledge of an extra two weeks, paid at a much more respectable £260 per week. And, in Labour’s separate Manifesto for Women, issued two days after the main event, there is an interesting promise to “consult on allowing grandparents who want to be more involved in caring for their grandchildren to share in parents’ unpaid parental leave, enabling them to take time off work without fear of losing their job”. This has been welcomed by the CBI, and represents a significant and well-deserved win for Grandparents Plus, which has mounted a sustained campaign on the issue.

And that’s about it. I just hope that, in 2020, at least some of the political parties will bear in mind the axiom that less is more. Because I just don’t think Sean Jones could survive 330 pages again.

Manifesto manifestations: Labour & Lib Dems offer hope on employment tribunal fees

I had been thinking I would save writing this post until after the main political parties have published their general election manifestos – which, back in the day, surely used to happen at the start of election campaigns? But it’s not often that I get a chance to write about good news and, well, I can contain myself no longer. For, over the past week or so, both Labour and the Liberal Democrats have restated their policy position on employment tribunal (ET) fees with a certainty and clarity that was previously somewhat lacking.

First up was Labour, which chose the afternoon my builders locked me out of my house (so away from my computer) to publish its Better Plan for Britain’s Workplaces (i.e. what normal people might have titled ‘Labour’s Manifesto for Work’). This states:

The introduction of fees of up to £1,200 for employment tribunal claimants has failed. It represents a significant barrier to workplace justice, and has failed to raise any money. Labour will abolish the Government’s employment tribunal fee system as part of reforms to make sure that workers have proper access to justice, employers get a quicker resolution, and the costs to the taxpayer are controlled. We will ask Acas to oversee a process led by the CBI and the TUC to agree reforms to the system.

Which is a significantly clearer (and bolder) statement of policy than that set out in last summer’s National Policy Forum report and first announced publicly if somewhat cryptically by shadow business secretary Chuka Umunna at the TUC conference in September, even if it still fails to answer the question of what kind of fees regime Labour might put in place of the current, “failed” regime. Which is an important question if, like me, you find it hard to believe that Labour would abolish fees outright. Or if you find it hard to believe that “a process” jointly led by a powerful business lobby group vehemently opposed to outright abolition would result in ‘agreement’ on outright abolition. Whatever, the clarification is vindication for those within Labour who have bravely pushed hard on the issue, especially NEC member Johanna Baxter.

However, the revised position also raises some new questions. If abolition of the current, “failed” regime would be tied to completion of a process, led by the CBI and TUC, of reaching agreement on a wider package of reforms aimed at ensuring that “employers get a quicker resolution, and the costs to the taxpayer are controlled”, how long would that take? Weeks? Months? A year? And would the current, “failed” regime continue in the meantime?

Call me picky, but to my mind that would be unacceptable. I suggest there would need to be an interim solution, involving an immediate (and substantial) reduction in the current level of claimant fees. Ideally, that would involve lowering both issue and hearing fees to a nominal level, at which I would hope to see them remain in the longer term as part of a revised fees regime including similarly nominal fees for employers to defend a claim, and a ‘polluter pays’ penalty on employers found by a tribunal to have flouted the law. The CBI has already indicated it could live with nominal fees for claimants, though of course it would have to be persuaded to accept nominal fees for respondents. Whatever, I very much doubt we will get answers to these (and other) questions before 7 May.

Three days later, and with much less fanfare, it emerged that Labour is not alone in tightening up its policy position on ET fees. On 4 April, employment lawyer (and Chair of the Law Society’s employment law committee) Laurie Anstis tweeted extracts from the contributions by each of the three main political parties to the April 2015 edition of the Employment Lawyers’ Association briefing (unpublished, but available online to ELA members, of which I am not one). The ELA had invited the three parties to “provide their manifesto proposals on employment law”, and the briefing sets out responses from Lord Hunt for the Conservatives, shadow BIS minister Ian Murray for Labour, and BIS employment relations minister Jo Swinson for the Liberal Democrats. Laurie has now very kindly provided me with a copy.

The section of Ian Murray’s contribution on ET fees is simply a reiteration of Labour’s previous, somewhat strangled position, now overtaken by the above events. And Lord Hunt hints that a Conservative government would go even further than the Coalition in restricting access to the ET system, as “There is still work to be done to ensure that ‘frivolous’ claims, which cost the taxpayer thousands of pounds in legal fees, are reduced”. There is? Really? But it was the contribution of Jo Swinson that most excited me (no, I never thought I’d write that either :-)). In a refreshingly candid section on ET fees, that is worth setting out in full (with my emphasis added), Ms Swinson says:

Liberal Democrats only supported the Conservative proposal to introduce employment tribunal fees on the basis that a rigorous review would be conducted, within a year of its introduction, to assess its impact and ensure no one was deterred from legitimate access to justice. Since fees were introduced, claims received by the employment tribunal have fallen substantially between July 2013 and September 2014 (notwithstanding the pre-claim conciliation service changing to the early conciliation service in [April] 2014).

Employers know that fees will put many potential claimants off bringing a claim. While I appreciate that many employment disputes will settle out of court, there is a real concern that bona fide claims are being unheard due to workers being unable to afford fees. Two years after its implementation, the Ministry of Justice’s failure to deliver an open and objective assessment of the impact of these reforms is inexcusable. It’s an issue repeatedly raised by myself and my colleague, Vince Cable. There is a clear, necessary and urgent need for this review to take place which goes to the credibility of our judicial system, not just the need for fairness.

There is also scope for tribunals to require the employer to reimburse a successful applicant. Studies have shown that over a third have not received any [of their monetary award] at all. It is absolutely wrong that employees end up paying fees in respect of successful claims for which they will never receive an award. The Liberal Democrats believe that a balance can be struck between managing the costs in terms of time, money and stresses of the tribunal system, and ensuring that employees’ rights are protected. That’s why we would review the level of tribunal fees to ensure that they do not prohibit people from making bona fide claims. A nominal fee could be appropriate to not unduly deter sound claims.

This is music to my ears, both on ET fees and on the shockingly common non-payment of awards, an issue I banged on about for a decade when at Citizens Advice, to very limited effect. Section 150 of the Small Business, Enterprise & Employment Act 2015, which received its Royal Assent in the last week of the Coalition, provides for the imposition of a financial penalty on employers who fail to pay an award (though as yet there’s no date for implementation). And just this week BIS added: “We are also introducing a scheme whereby employers who receive [such] a penalty may be publicly named.” But the next government needs to return to this issue, as there is still more to do, and Labour should think about including it in its proposed ‘reform process’ led by the CBI and TUC (which would, one hopes, include others such as the ELA).

So, I was a very happy bunny over the Easter weekend, and I’m looking forward to reading the Labour and Liberal Democrat manifestos. Normal service will no doubt resume shortly.

[With thanks to Laurie Anstis for granting me permission to include the above extracts from the ELA briefing]

NMW naming & shaming: frying the small fry?

On Tuesday, in what might well prove to be her last significant act as BIS employment relations minister, Jo Swinson named a further round of 48 employers found by HMRC to have breached the National Minimum Wage (NMW). The BIS press release notes:

Between them, the companies named owe workers over £162,000 in arrears, and span sectors including fashion, publishing, hospitality, health and fitness, automotive, care, and retail. This latest round brings the total number of companies named and shamed under the new regime to 210 employers, with total arrears of over £635,000 and total penalties of over £248,000.

With this sixth round of naming & shaming coming just four weeks after the last one (of 70 employers, on 24 February), and just two months after the one before that (of 37 employers, on 15 January), it’s clear that the rebooted regime that came into force in October 2013 has finally ground up through the gears to reach full speed. And, were there not a general election on 7 May, we could expect this pattern of monthly BIS press releases, each naming some 50 employers, to continue from now on. Accordingly, now seems a good time to take stock of what has been achieved to date, and what that tells us about HMRC’s enforcement of the NMW more generally. So I’ve been crunching the numbers.

Perhaps the most striking – and significant – aspect of my number crunching is that the numbers are pretty small. Although the 210 named & shamed employers between them owed a total of £638,100 to a total of 5,396 workers, some 72 per cent (3,863) of those workers were underpaid by the three worst-offending employers (in terms of number of workers underpaid, though not necessarily the total or average arrears owed). In 121 (58 per cent) of cases, the employer had underpaid just one worker, and only in 12 cases had the employer underpaid 20 or more workers.

Similarly, in 180 (86 per cent) of cases, the total arrears owed by the employer was less than £5,000, and only five employers owed total arrears of more than £20,000 (the current maximum penalty imposed by HMRC in addition to payment of the arrears owed, which is otherwise set at 100% of the total arrears owed). Even more strikingly, overall, the average arrears owed per worker was just £118.25, or just 0.6 per cent of the new maximum penalty of £20,000 per worker provided for in the Small Business, Enterprise & Employment Bill, on the verge of receiving Royal Assent.

Indeed, only 30 employers (14 per cent) owed arrears of more than £2,000 per worker, and only two employers owed arrears of more than £10,000 per worker (NB in both cases, there was only one underpaid worker). In most cases, the sum owed per worker was relatively small: 104 of the 210 employers owed arrears of less than £500 per worker.

The impression that HMRC’s enforcement net is catching mostly small fry is reinforced when we breakdown the 210 employers by sector. From the following chart (which shows only those sectors with two or more of the 210 employers), we can see that 41 – almost one in five – of the 210 employers are hairdressers or beauty salons, and 37 (18 per cent) are a pub, restaurant, cafe or hotel. Only three care homes or home care firms have been named & shamed to date, and in those three cases the arrears owed per worker were just £178.76, £162.81, and £87.68 respectively. Yet, as noted previously, there is broad agreement that at least 200,000 of the social care sector’s 1.5 million workers are unlawfully paid below the NMW.

Name&shame

Yes, there are a few household names among the 210, including (in this week’s round) French Connection UK, Foot Locker, 99p Stores, Pizza Hut, and Bounty (UK) Ltd, which produces the ‘Bounty Packs’ handed out to new mothers. But most such cases appear to involve what Jo Swinson calls “irresponsible mistakes”, rather than the employer “wilfully breaking the law”. French Connection, for example, owed an average of £44.78 to 367 workers, while fellow high street fashion retailer H&M owed an average of just £4.82 to 540 workers.

All in all, the detail behind the headline numbers suggests that whoever has Ms Swinson’s job after 7 May should do rather more than simply decide whether to continue with the monthly BIS naming & shaming press releases. It’s time that HMRC’s enforcement net started catching some of the bigger (and nastier) fish in Britain’s minimum wage rogue lake, as well as the small fry. And that may well require new priorities, new strategies, and (even more) new money.

 

 

 

 

ET fees: the BIS minister that time forgot

On Saturday, in a stunning example of the laughably low journalistic standards at the Daily Mail and the inability of some political dinosaurs to adapt to changes in the known environment, the paper re-ran it’s infamous story of the ‘£1.6 billion a year gravy train for employment lawyers’ derailed by ET fees.

In a bold attempt on the world record for the number of factual errors in the opening paragraph of a newspaper article, and appropriately illustrated with a stock photo of a gavel – never used in British courts, let alone employment tribunals – the paper’s political editor, James Chapman, writes:

“The £1.6 billion a year industrial tribunal gravy train has been brought to a shuddering halt. Official figures reveal there has been a fall of almost 80 per cent in the number of cases brought against firms by employees. Business leaders said the Government’s introduction of changes to deter vexatious claims appeared to have ended the damaging ‘no win, no fee’ culture that flourished under Labour.”

At no point in the article does Chapman bother to explain how he arrived at his figure of £1.6 billion a year, but he does throw around a few clues by telling us that, thanks to ET fees:

“The level of claims has returned to levels seen in the early 2000s, before the escalation of no win, no fee cases helped the number to spiral to almost 240,000 a year. Under the last government the taxpayer met the £86 million a year cost of running the tribunals. Firms were spending around £1.6 billion a year in defence costs. The British Chamber of Commerce estimated the average cost to a business of defending itself at tribunal is £8,500, and the average cost of agreeing a settlement is £5,400.”

However, we don’t need Chapman to tell us how he got his £1.6 billion figure, because we know this from the original version of his article, penned by Steve Doughty and which appeared in the Daily Mail as long ago as 29 July 2014. That article – headlined “Hallelujah! The gravy train’s derailed” – informed us that “there were 191,000 employment claims in the financial year to March 2013 … with the average defence costing £8,500.” Multiply £8,500 by 191,000 and you get … £1.6 billion.

Strangely, that July 2014 article made no mention of ‘no win, no fee’ lawyers – the target of Doughty’s wrath being “the multi-billion pound industry built on vexatious discrimination claims against employers.” But the evident source of that vexatious story (and another in the Sunday Express the same week), Conservative BIS minister Matthew Hancock, has this time put his head above the parapet to tell Chapman that:

“Labour’s compensation culture was totally out of hand. It cost millions and warned businesses off creating jobs because of the risk of being held to ransom by a spurious claim. We have worked hard to reform tribunals so they work better and more fairly … and genuine abuses can be dealt with properly and only reach court where absolutely necessary. Yet Ed Miliband has not learned lessons and would reverse this progress.”

In fact, it is Matthew Hancock and James Chapman who have failed both to learn the lessons from the debacle of the Daily Mail’s July 2014 article, and to absorb the factual evidence that has emerged from the Ministry of Injustice over the past eight months.

Let’s leave aside the facts that employment tribunals haven’t been called industrial tribunals since 1998, and that employment tribunal cases are down by some 65 per cent, not “almost 80 per cent”, and focus on Chapman’s ignorant confusion of employment tribunal claims, and employment tribunal cases. For the BCC’s average cost figures of £8,500 for a business to defend itself at a tribunal hearing, and £5,400 to agree a settlement, are per employment tribunal case, not employment tribunal claim. And there have never been 191,000 – let alone 240,000 – employment tribunal cases a year; those figures are for the total number of claims, including both single claimants and all the claimants in the relatively small number of multiple claimant cases. If the concern is the impact of ET claims on business, then it is the total number of cases (single claims/cases + multiple claimant cases) that is most meaningful, since that is also the number of employers affected.

In 2012-13, the headline total of 191,541 claims used by Doughty to calculate his £1.6 billion figure consisted of 54,704 single claims/cases brought against 54,704 employers (or slightly fewer than that, in fact, as some claims would have been against the same employer), and a total of 136,837 multiple claimants in just 6,104 multiple claimant cases brought against 6,104 employers. So Doughty would have been a little more accurate if he had multiplied the BCC’s figure of £8,500 by 60,808, not 191,541.

Furthermore, the £8,500 figure is wrong, firstly because it’s a considerable over-estimate (the government’s own figure is £6,200), and secondly because only about one in five cases go to a tribunal hearing. Most cases are settled or otherwise resolved before they reach a hearing, so the BCC’s lower figure of £5,400 applies (though, again, the government’s own figure for settlements is £3,500). Indeed, the government’s figure for the average cost to employers across all tribunal outcomes is just £3,900.

So, all in all, Doughty’s bogus figure of £1.6 billion – mindlessly regurgitated eight months later by Chapman – is more like £366 million (£0.37 billion), if you accept the BCC’s dodgy average cost figures, and just £237 million (£0.24 billion) if you prefer the government’s more reliable average cost figure of £3,900. And, finally, only about two-thirds of that total cost to employers is borne by businesses, as one in three employment tribunal cases (including the vast majority of those pesky multiple claimant cases) are brought against employers in the public and voluntary sectors. In short, Doughty and Chapman overstate the ‘problem’ for their beloved private sector firms by a factor of 10.

As for the dinosaur Hancock, his entire argument rests on the assumption that only weak or vexatious claims/cases have been deterred by the hefty, upfront fees. But if that were true, and only strong claims/cases were making it to the tribunals, the proportion of successful claims would have risen towards 100 per cent, and the proportion of unsuccessful claims would have dropped towards zero. And what we – but seemingly not the Minister – have learned since he first fed the ‘£1.6 billion gravy train’ story to the Daily Mail and Sunday Express in July 2014, is that the very opposite is happening.

As the following chart (based on official figures) shows, the proportion of successful claims (the blue line) has gone sharply down, not up, and at just eight per cent in the most recent quarter for which the figures are available (July to September 2014) was less than half that in each of the six years before the introduction of fees. And the proportion of unsuccessful claims is markedly up, not down.

outcomes

Now, it might be said that the proportions shown in the above chart are not the full story, as four in five claims do not go to a hearing, and are either conciliated (i.e. settled) by Acas, or are withdrawn by the claimant. And, as Naomi Cunningham and Michael Reed have noted recently, “most of these withdrawals, but not all, represent some form of non-Acas settlement.” So, it might be said that the proportion that matters is the grand total of those claims that are successful at a hearing or result in a default judgment, plus those that are conciliated by Acas, and those that are withdrawn.

However, as the following chart shows, that proportion has also gone down, not up.

outcomesALL

So, another Hancockusaurus and Daily Mail #Fail. Though you do have to admire their persistence.

ET fees income from single claimants (wonkish)

Last week’s publication by the Ministry of Injustice of the latest set of quarterly tribunal statistics, covering October to December 2014, was in many ways a damp squib that added little to what we already know about the impact of ET fees since July 2013. ET claim/case numbers continued to bobble along at about one-third the pre-fees level, and the claim outcome percentages – which might have enabled us to pour further scorn on the assertion of Matthew Hancock and others that only weak or vexatious claims have been deterred by the fees – were rendered meaningless by the striking out of one exceptionally large multiple claimant airline case involving some 243,000 claims.

The only real cause for excitement – yes, I’m that sad – was the inclusion, for the first time, of figures on applications for and grants of fee remission (or ‘fee waivers’, as ministers have taken to calling it). From the four tables in Annex D, covering the five quarters up to September 2014, we learnt that 95 per cent of remission grants to single claimants have been for full remission, and only five per cent for partial remission. And we learnt that, while 48 per cent of the single claimants from whom the issue fee was requested applied for remission, only 21 per cent of those from whom a hearing fee was requested did so.

With a bit of work, the figures also allow us to unpack – to some extent at least – the Ministry’s previous statement that gross annual fee income is running at about £12 million, of which some £3.2 million is “foregone in remission”. Because there is enough data spread over the four tables in Annex D to construct the following table for gross and net fee income from, and remission to, single claim/cases (but not multiple claimant cases, or EAT cases) over the 12-month period October 2013 to September 2014.

Issue fee (single claims/cases)
Gross income (£) Remission (£) Net fee income (£)
Type A 619,360 102,720 516,640
Type B 3,906,250 794,000 3,112,250
Total 4,525,610 896,720 3,628,890
Hearing fee (single claims/cases)
Gross income (£) Remission (£) Net fee income (£)
Type A 286,005 25,415 260,590
Type B 3,984,775 1,312,425 2,672,350
Total 4,270,780 1,337,840 2,932,940
Total (£) 8,796,390 2,234,560 6,561,830

(NB – To arrive at these figures, I assumed that the five per cent of claimants granted partial fee remission received an average remission of 50 per cent of the relevant fee.)

From this, we can see that single claimants in the ETs contribute £8.8 million (73 per cent) of the Ministry’s gross income of £12 million, and £6.56 million (75 per cent) of the Ministry’s net income of £8.8 million. And they benefit from £2.23 million (70 per cent) of the £3.2 million foregone in fee remission. The other 25 per cent (£2.2 million) of the Ministry’s net fee income comes from claimants in multiple claimant cases, and appellants to the EAT.

We can also see that, of that £8.8 million contribution to the Ministry’s gross fee income, £7.9 million (90 per cent) comes from claimants making Type B claims (e.g. discrimination, unfair dismissal). Similarly, of the total £2.23 million foregone in remission, all but £128,000 (5.7 per cent) is granted to those making Type B claims.

Well, I think that’s interesting, and if your name’s Michael Reed I suspect you will too. However, in terms of what might happen next, it’s probably much less significant than this tweet, posted on 11 March but which I only stumbled upon today:

Screen Shot 2015-03-18 at 16.04.46

Which conveys a somewhat different message to these and similar tweets by other Labour shadow ministers in recent months:

Screen Shot 2015-03-18 at 16.25.14

Screen Shot 2015-03-18 at 17.46.08

No wonder then, that Sadiq Khan got the following response from junior injustice minister Shailesh Vara when he raised the issue of tribunal and court fees in the House of Commons on Tuesday:

Screen Shot 2015-03-18 at 08.09.31

Followed shortly after by this response from the Lord of Injustice himself, Chris Grayling:

Screen Shot 2015-03-18 at 08.21.32

And then there’s former shadow attorney general Emily Thornberry, who yesterday re-iterated (during her Westminster Hall debate on equal pay) her proposal that equal pay claims be exempted from ET fees for five years – the clear implication being that she would be happy for fees to continue for other claims.

Sadly, working out what the three tweets above, and Emily Thornberry’s proposal, might tell us about the policy on ET fees of any future Labour government is beyond my tiny brain. So I’m going to bed.

NMW enforcement: the politics (and economics) of justice

Earlier this week, Labour launched a press and Twitter offensive against Conservative BIS minister George Freeman, after the latter appeared to dismiss the former’s concern about enforcement of the minimum wage as “the politics of envy”. During a short Delegated Legislation Committee debate on draft minimum wage Regulations on Monday, Freeman had been pressed by Labour MPs Stella Creasy and Stephen Doughty on the number of criminal prosecutions of employers for breach of the minimum wage – just one under Freeman’s government to date. And, towards the end of the debate, Ms Creasy hinted at a surprising lack of knowledge of the enforcement regime on her part when she demanded:

Will the Minister talk us through the consequences to companies of not following the [NMW] regulations? If the number of prosecutions is so low, and those who are named and shamed can bear the brunt of not being popular, is there really any consequence of not paying all those low-paid workers?

The Minister responded:

As I set out in my opening remarks, there are very heavy penalties [for non-compliance]. The hon. Lady may not ever have run a business, but I assure her that for people who do so, fines and reputational damage are a major force for compliance. Prosecutions may satisfy the politics of envy of the Opposition, but they are not the best mechanism to drive compliance.

A crass remark, for sure, but one problem with Labour’s head office and MPs making such a loud and gleeful noise about it is that it invites us to ask what approach Labour would take to enforcement of the minimum wage should they find themselves in government on 8 May.

For, crassness aside, the Minister makes a good point. The criminal prosecution of minimum wage rogues has never been a key element of the enforcement regime, with the Labour government that established the regime itself managing only seven prosecutions in the four years after criminal sanctions came into force in 2006. Indeed, that Labour government had deliberately created an enforcement regime based on HMRC securing compliance (and payment of arrears to workers) through investigation and the imposition of civil penalties, without resorting to resource-draining prosecutions in the criminal courts. So it is at least arguable that every prosecution represents a failure of the enforcement regime, as designed by Labour. In other words, the fewer prosecutions there are, the better.

Certainly, the number of prosecutions is not a very helpful yardstick. What matters most is whether minimum wage-flouting employers believe there is a real risk they will be investigated by HMRC. And that depends upon the financial resources made available to HMRC for intelligence gathering, inspections, and investigations.

In any case, the inescapable fact is that criminal prosecutions are at least 25 times more costly than a standard investigation by HMRC. According to official figures cited in the Trust for London report Settle for nothing less, a criminal prosecution costs at least £50,000, while the average HMRC investigation costs just £1,850. So, if prospective ministers such as Ms Creasy want there to be more criminal prosecutions from 7 May, they will either have to come up with (a lot) more money, or face presiding over a substantial cut in the number of HMRC investigations.

To date, there has been no indication from any shadow minister that Labour would increase the spend on minimum wage enforcement – which the Coalition has recently increased by an impressive 50 per cent, from £8 million in 2013-14, to £9 million in 2014-15, and a budgeted £12 million for 2015-16. Indeed, Vince Cable and Jo Swinson have steadily shot most of Labour’s minimum wage enforcement foxes: naming & shaming is (finally) gearing up; the maximum civil penalty has been increased from £5,000 to £20,000; and, as I’ve noted previously on this blog, that maximum penalty will increase again to a more than adequate £20,000 per underpaid worker just as soon as the Small Business, Enterprise & Employment Bill becomes law. Poor Labour MPs are left waving little more than a meaningless pledge to ‘increase’ the maximum penalty to £50,000 (per employer or per worker, no one’s thought it necessary to spell out).

So, do Labour plan to reshape the enforcement regime, with a new emphasis on (expensive) criminal prosecutions? I put that question to Ms Creasy and Mr Doughty on Twitter, but they didn’t respond. I guess it’s easier to make fun of hapless government ministers than it is to explain what you’d do differently if you were sitting in their ministerial chair.

Postscript: Ms Creasy appears to have read this post, but has not (yet) taken the opportunity to explain the extent to which criminal prosecutions would feature in a Labour government’s approach to enforcement of the minimum wage.

ET fees: how to find Sadiq Khan £20 million

With Labour shadow ministers and policy wonks seemingly too scared of their own shadows to find a place in their ‘better economic plan’ for their party’s employer-friendly policy pledge to at least substantially reduce the Coalition’s employment tribunal fees, now seems a good time to revisit my April 2014 attempt to set out a fiscally credible means of delivering on that pledge.

Since April 2014, we’ve learnt a fair bit about the level of fee income to the Ministry of Injustice, and the operational cost savings to the Ministry resulting from the steep decline in claims/cases since July 2013. Fee income (net of fee remission) is running at £8.8 million per year, and gross annual expenditure on the employment tribunal system has fallen by £14.4 million, from £86.7 million in 2012/13 (the last financial year before fees), to £76.3 million in 2013/14 (when fees were in force for eight months of the financial year), and £72.3 million in 2014/15. So, assuming for one moment that outright abolition of the fees regime would return the number of claims/cases to pre-fees levels, such abolition now appears to carry a price tag of some £23.2 million per year (£8.8m + £14.4m).

However, it’s very unlikely that outright abolition of the fees regime would return the number of claims/cases to 100% of its pre-fees level, for the simple reason that claim/case numbers had been in slow but steady decline for several years before the introduction of fees in July 2013, and that downward trend would most likely have continued had fees not been introduced. In other words, some – perhaps as much as 15 per cent – of that £14.4 million reduction in operational costs would have happened anyway. Furthermore, the figure of £14.4 includes efficiency savings made within the ET system unrelated to the impact of fees. So, as precision is not really available to us here, let’s just say that the actual price tag associated with outright abolition of the fees regime would be more like £20 million per year.

Now, many will say that £20 million is a piddling sum, and in one sense they’re right: it’s just 0.3 per cent of the Ministry’s overall annual budget of £6.8 billion. But there’s ample evidence that any incoming Chancellor and Justice Secretary would take a different view. Money is going to be very tight under the government elected on 7 May (or, the government undemocratically constructed by political horse-trading in the days following 7 May). In any case, it’s pretty clear that Labour’s policy pledge on fees does not amount to outright abolition (and all that the Liberal Democrats have said so far is that they’d conduct a review). So, it’s more realistic to assume that fees will remain in some form, and to set ourselves the task of constructing an alternative fees regime that would restore access to justice, while covering at least some of that £20 million.

To my mind, that implies no more than nominal fees for claimants. In April 2014, I suggested flat-rate issue and hearing fees of £50. And I argued that, with the advent of state-funded early conciliation of potential claims by Acas, there’s a perfectly sound case for employers having to pay similar fees to defend a claim that they have failed to resolve via Acas. If the number of single claims/cases rose to just 30,000 per year – almost double the current rate of 17,000 per year, but still well below the 54,700 in 2012-13 – such fees would generate £3 million per year in issue fees and, assuming 20 per cent of cases went to a hearing, a further £600,000 per year in hearing fees.

Alternatively, if the number of single claims/cases rose to 40,000 per year – more than twice the current rate of 17,000 per year, but still 27 per cent down on 2012-13 – such nominal issue and hearing fees would generate a total income of £4.8 million per year from single claims/cases.

In April 2014, I also suggested that each claimant in a multiple claimant case pay nominal, flat-rate but reduced issue and hearing fees of £25, and I see no good reason to resile from that view. If the number of such claimants increased to 60,000 per year – double the current rate of 28,000 per year, but still well below the 136,800 in 2012-13 – that would generate another £1.5 million per year in issue fees and, assuming (perhaps conservatively) that 50 per cent of such claims would go to a hearing, a further £750,000 in hearing fees. To that we can add £225,000 in issue and hearing fees (of £50 each) from the 3,000 defending employers, making some £2.5 million in total.

Yes, that amounts to only £7.3 million at most (assuming 40,000 single claims/cases). But those figures are based on scenarios in which claim/case numbers would rise from their current low level, but still remain well below their pre-fees level. In which case, the price tag associated with such a modest fees regime would be much less than the £20 million cited above. And, in the event that claim/case numbers rose to just below their 2012-13 level (say, 50,000 single claims, and 100,000 multiple claims in 5,000 multiple claimant cases), my nominal fees regime would then generate a total fee income of £10.1 million per year (which, you may remember, is what Ministry officials said in 2012 would have to be raised by any alternative regime to their own).

Of course, that would still leaves us £9.9 million short on our £20 million. But the final element of my April 2014 proposal was a ‘polluter pays’ penalty for those employers found by a tribunal to have breached the law – that is, those employers that create the need for an employment tribunal system. Each year, about 12 per cent of all claims are successful at a hearing or result in a default judgement in favour of the claimant. And, if claim/case numbers rose to just below their 2012-13 level, as described in the previous paragraph, there would be about 6,500 losing employers. Imposing a penalty of £1,000 on each of those losing employers – a hefty sum, for sure, but still less than the £1,200 some claimants have to pay in fees now – would generate an income of £6.5 million.

But your name is Sadiq Khan or Ed Balls, and you’re still fretting about another £3.4 million. So increase my ‘polluter pays’ penalty to £1,500. Why shouldn’t employers found by a tribunal to have acted unlawfully make such a contribution to the overall cost of the tribunal system? They would have had ample opportunity to settle the claim by that stage, including through early conciliation by Acas.

There are, of course, any number of ways in which my proposed nominal fees (plus ‘polluter pays’ penalty) regime could be tweaked, but the essential point is that it is entirely feasible to construct a regime based on very low level claimant fees that would nevertheless cover most if not all of the increase in operational costs associated with the inevitable increase in claim/case numbers.

 

 

Labour losing race to the top on employment rights policy

So, the supposedly free-market Tories have had their Stalinist-sounding ‘long-term economic plan’, and now Labour has a ‘better economic plan’. Towards the end of the latter, a chapter entitled ‘Supporting firms to win the race to the top, not get dragged into a race to the bottom’, states:

Too often it is assumed that the only way for firms in sectors such as retail, hospitality and social care to compete is by cutting employee pay and conditions. But many firms in these sectors want to be able to compete through higher skill, higher wage business models, without being undercut and dragged into a race to the bottom.

The [Coalition] Government has actively encouraged a race to the bottom by weakening the UK’s enforcement regime and promoting a hire-and-fire culture: doubling the qualification period for unfair dismissal, introducing fees for employment tribunals, and setting up a controversial scheme whereby employees trade their employment rights in return for a share in the company.

[Labour’s new industrial strategy] is about giving employers the tools they need to raise standards, and also protect them from being undercut, by raising the minimum wage, ending the abuse of zero-hours contracts, and making it illegal to use agency workers to undercut wages and conditions.

Bafflingly, there’s no further mention of – let alone any pledge to reverse – that doubling of the unfair dismissal qualifying period. Nor is there any mention of Labour’s previous pledge to reform the tribunal fees that have done so much damage to the ‘enforcement regime’. Given that employer lobby groups such as the CBI and FSB have openly called for the hefty fees to be substantially lowered, this is an astonishing omission from what is clearly intended to be a business-friendly document.

Indeed, once you cut through the rather repetitive references to ‘the race to the bottom’ and ‘raising our ambitions for the domestically-traded sectors’, there are precious few commitments to policy reform that might actually help achieve the plan’s lofty goals. Apart from reiterating both welcome plans to “encourage more employers to pay a living wage” and the disappointingly modest pledge to “increase the minimum wage to £8 an hour before 2020”, the 80-page document sets out just three broad policy pledges specific to “reducing the pressures employers face to get dragged into a race to the bottom”:

1. Banning the abuse of zero-hours contracts: giving workers on zero-hours contracts new legal rights to be protected from employers forcing them to be available at all hours, insisting they cannot work for anyone else, or cancelling shifts at short notice without compensation, and giving workers on zero-hours contracts who are actually working regular hours week-in week-out a right to a contract with fixed minimum hours. We will also introduce a new Acas Code of Practice [on zero-hours contracts].

This is all very well, but – as I’ve previously noted elsewhere and the document itself recognises just two paragraphs later, in relation to enforcement of the minimum wage – there is no point having rules if they are not enforced. And, presumably, the only way to enforce these proposed new rules would be for individual workers to pursue a tribunal claim against their abusive employer. Which very few workers would be likely to do, even without the fees of up to £1,200 on which the document is so surprisingly silent. So, new Labour ministers could huff and puff all they like, but their shiny new rules wouldn’t blow many rogue employers down.

2. Tackling undercutting by rogue employment agencies: taking action to crack down on rogue agencies that exploit workers illegally for profit – for example through a licensing system that ensures agencies are complying with basic standards or stopped from operating; extending the Gangmasters Licensing Authority approach to cover sectors where there is evidence of high levels of migrant labour and exploitative working practices; and closing the loophole in the Agency Workers Directive that allows agency workers to be used to undercut employees.

This is more encouraging, even if it is somewhat ill-defined. However, both the employer lobby groups and past Labour ministers have been strongly against extending the GLA’s licensing regime to other sectors – with good reason. And, since 2010, Coalition ministers have reduced the BIS employment agency standards inspectorate to a rump of just three staff. So it’s not at all clear who Ed Miliband, Rachel Reeves and Chuka Umunna think would do all the cracking down. In short, there’s a lot of work yet to be done on this policy pledge if it’s to become more than a vague sop to the TUC, which has stuck rigidly to its call to extend the GLA regime.

3. Ensuring proper enforcement of the rules: there is no point in having rules if they are not enforced. Under this Government, the number of inspections into whether the National Minimum Wage was being paid has more than halved and there have been just two prosecutions since 2010. There is widespread agreement that better enforcement would support employers that play by the rules. Labour will improve this by: increasing the fines for breaching the minimum wage to £50,000; extending the remit of the HMRC minimum wage unit to cover holiday pay; giving councils a role in enforcement; and trebling the fines for knowingly employing illegal migrants.

The last of this third set of policy actions is little more than dog whistle politics, but there’s a good case for capitalising on the local, front-line knowledge of councils in order to improve enforcement of the NMW. And extending the HMRC unit’s remit to cover holiday pay is something I suggested in 2011, as an obvious first step in incrementally fusing the HMRC unit and the GLA into a genuine fair employment agency; more recently, it was a recommendation of the June 2014 report on low pay by Alan Buckle.

But Labour are kidding themselves – and the voting public – if they think that increasing the maximum penalty for breaching the NMW to £50,000 will have more than a marginal impact. For the penalty is set at 100 per cent of the total arrears owed, and in all but a handful of cases that sum is relatively small, and certainly well below £50,000. For example, among the 162 NMW-flouting firms named and shamed by BIS to date, including the tranche of 70 named today, the total arrears owed – and so the penalty imposed – was less than £10,000 in 154 cases, and exceeded the current maximum of £20,000 in just four cases. And, as they each involved a number of workers, those four cases would have been more than adequately covered by the Government’s proposed new maximum penalty of £20,000 per underpaid worker, set out in the Small Business, Enterprise & Employment Bill and almost certain to become law before Parliament is dissolved on 30 March.

Of course, Labour could increase the penalties by increasing the penalty rate from 100 per cent of the arrears owed to, say, 200 per cent. But that’s quite different to what Labour are saying they would do, and might be quite hard to justify when, in the vast majority of cases, the total sum owed in underpayments is relatively small, and the employer is a (very) small business. Among the 162 firms named and shamed by BIS, the average underpayment per worker was just £306.11, and no fewer than 35 of the 162 firms are hairdressers or beauty salons. We’re (mostly) not talking big corporates here.

All in all, Labour’s ‘better economic plan’ is depressingly short on credible, fully-formed (and costed) policy ideas for halting the race to the bottom in pay and working conditions. The good news is that I’m available to help sort that out, and my daily rate is a lot less than Jack Straw’s.

Waiting for your call, Chuka.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Will the next government put the ‘fair’ back into unfair dismissal law?

Last week, for some reason, my mind kept wandering back to 2011, the year in which every stakeholder meeting with BIS officials was dominated by a shouty policy wonk from the British Chambers of Commerce. The year in which BIS spent taxpayers’ money compiling a consultation response that – without so much as a ‘winking’ emoticon to let you in on the joke – stated:

In a survey of 1,100 of their nuttiest members, the Institute of Directors told us that large numbers of businesses had expressed concerns about dismissal and the risk of tribunal claims in relation to recruitment plans. Fifty-one per cent of respondents to the survey said that the one-year qualifying period for unfair dismissal was a ‘significant’ or ‘very significant’ factor in considering whether to take on an additional employee.

Yes, OK, I added ‘nuttiest’. But I don’t think it makes any difference. For the fact is business secretary Vince Cable opted to extend the unfair dismissal qualifying period to two years, on the basis that 561 (two per cent) of the 34,000 members of a Pall Mall-based organisation that’s had only two female heads in its 112-year history thought they could get a bit more deregulation of the labour market by ticking a box in a survey questionnaire. Perhaps, being a Liberal Democrat, Dr Cable just felt a natural affinity with the largely woman-free Institute.

To be fair to Dr Cable, the somewhat less nutty CBI did say that extending the unfair dismissal qualifying period would “have a positive impact on marginal hiring decisions, particularly in smaller firms.” But then that sort of depends on how you define ‘marginal’. Because what the November 2011 BIS consultation response failed to note is that, at that time, the UK’s 1.2 million employers faced an unfair dismissal claim just once every 27.5 years, on average. So, if business leaders really were hamstrung by anxiety over whether their next hiring decision would result in an unfair dismissal ET claim, then we know who to blame for the UK economy lagging behind so many of its competitors.

The BIS consultation response also overlooked the fact that, as shown by the following chart, the number of unfair dismissal claims had been declining steadily since early 2009 (when, of course, the economy was not exactly in best form). Faced with such statistical evidence, as distinct from the views of a self-selecting sliver of the membership of an exclusive Pall Mall club, most time-pressed ministers would probably have opted not to try and fix something not obviously broken. But poor Dr Cable had the abominable Adrian Beecroft and his pals in 10 and 11 Downing Street to deal with. So, with the economy struggling to get out of first gear, Dr Cable thought it best to make workers (aka consumers) a little bit more insecure, but not quite as insecure as Beecroft would have made them.

UDeras

And so it was that, in April 2012, the Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012 extended the unfair dismissal qualifying period from 12 months to two years, and what we might call the Blair-Brown era of unfair dismissal claims (the red columns in the chart) came to an end. Then, somewhat ironically, given that the BIS consultation response had predicted the extension would result in a 3.3 per cent fall in the number of unfair dismissal claims, the dawn of the Beecroft-Cable era (the blue columns in the chart) saw a not insignificant increase in the number of such claims. (That 3.3 per cent, incidentally, is what we policy nerds call ‘spurious precision’. BIS had absolutely no idea how much claim numbers would fall by, if at all, but cunningly concealed that fact by suggesting it had calculated the drop to a tenth of one per cent. MPs and especially journalists fall for this every day of the week.)

Yes, there might have been an even bigger rise, had Dr Cable not acted as indecisively as he did. There’s simply no way of knowing. Whatever, by early 2013, the number of unfair dismissal claims had slipped back pretty much to where it had been in late 2010. And then, of course, we entered the Grayling-Swinson era (the orange columns in the chart), during which the number of unfair dismissal claims has fallen to levels not seen since the Institute of Directors last had a female head, in 1926. With the result that UK employers now face an unfair dismissal ET claim just once every 87 years, on average.

In short, this was evidence-free policy making, based on nothing more than an ideological hunch that eroding legal protection against unfair dismissal would somehow boost job creation. Yet, amid ever greater casualisation of the labour market, the move has unquestionably shifted the imbalance of power between workers and employers a little bit more in favour of the latter. So, with the economy now doing somewhat better than it was in late 2011, there’s a good case for putting the qualifying period back to one year (or even lowering it all the way to six months).

Good employers would have nothing to fear from such a move, as the law on unfair dismissal does not prevent an employer from dismissing a qualifying employee for incompetence or even just for not working hard enough – it simply requires the employer to follow a fair process when doing so. And, as Simon Jones notes in this blog post, that isn’t hard to do. But a shorter qualifying period would create a bit more security in what is an increasingly insecure labour market.

It seems safe to assume this is not a direction of travel in which Conservative ministers would go after 7 May, and the Liberal Democrats’ pre-manifesto, published last September, is entirely silent on the matter. The July 2014 report of Labour’s National Policy Forum, which is supposed to form the basis of the party’s general election manifesto, does include the extension of the qualifying period among a list of Coalition policies that have “fundamentally undermined employment rights”, but there’s no clear commitment to reverse the extension. Similarly, Labour’s better economic plan for prosperity, published yesterday, states:

The [Coalition] Government has actively encouraged a race to the bottom [in wages and skills] by weakening the UK’s enforcement regime and promoting a hire-and-fire culture: doubling the qualification period for unfair dismissal; introducing fees for employment tribunals; and setting up a controversial scheme whereby employees trade their employment rights in return for a share in the company.

Despite this highlighting of the issue, there’s still no place in the plan for a pledge to reverse the doubling of the qualifying period for unfair dismissal (or, indeed, to do anything at all about the equally controversial employment tribunal fees). But then there was no mention in the National Policy Forum report of increasing paternity leave and pay, and that omission – together with a price tag of some £150m per year – hasn’t prevented Ed Miliband from pledging to do exactly that if Labour win in May.

If they genuinely believe in supporting businesses to win the race to the top, not get dragged into a race to the bottom, senior figures in both Labour and the Liberal Democrats should ensure their election manifesto includes a commitment to promptly lower the unfair dismissal qualifying period to 12 months. British bosses should not need more than 12 months to decide whether or not they’ve hired the right person. And the Institute of Directors should be told to go fish.